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Abstract 
Here we examine imaginative drawing abilities in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) and learning disabilities (LD) under several conditions: spontaneous production, with 
use of a template, and combining two real entities to form an ‘unreal’ entity.  Sixteen children 
in each group, matched on mental and chronological age, were asked to draw a number of 
‘impossible’ pictures of humans and dogs. Children with ASD were impaired in spontaneous 
drawings and included fewer impossible features than children with LD, but there was no 
difference when a template was provided. An autism-specific deficit was revealed in the task 
involving combining entities. Results suggest that children with ASD do not have a general 
imaginative deficit; impairment is instead related to planning demands.  
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Brief report:  Imaginative drawing in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder and learning 
disabilities 
 Imagination requires the ability to shift from reality and ‘decouple’ (Leslie, 1987), 
and underpins both cognitive and emotional development (Harris, 2000).  Children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have documented impairment in imagination, reflected in 
repetitive behavior (Bodfish, Symons, Parker, & Lewis, 2000; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; Wing & Gould, 1979) and difficulties with pretense and symbolic play 
(Jarrold, Boucher, & Smith, 1996; Wolfberg, 2009; see Jarrold, 2003 for a review).  One way 
imagination has been assessed in children with ASD is by analyzing creative drawings, which 
can provide a rich way to assess conceptual knowledge (Freeman, 1980; Cox, 2005) without 
the requirement of verbal explanations that can be difficult for children with language 
impairment.  
 In one of the first studies to test imagination in ASD in this way, Scott and Baron-
Cohen (1996) showed that children with ASD were significantly worse at drawing 
‘impossible’ men or houses (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1990), than a comparison group with 
learning disabilities (LD).  The authors suggested that the representation of real objects and 
imagined objects depends on different neurocognitive processes, and thus children with ASD 
show a ‘pure’ deficit in imagining unreal entities. However, Leevers & Harris (1998) 
challenged this interpretation, and posited instead that children with ASD may have specific 
difficulty deploying new and complex visuo-spatial plans (e.g. a planning deficit), and thus 
revert back to familiar graphic schema which are easier to execute. In their study, participants 
were given templates to complete, such as a headless man.  The rationale was that providing 
contextual information would reduce the planning demands required of the participants, and 
thus make the task more directly targeted at identifying imagination.  When given such cues, 
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children with ASD were just as able to depict impossible entities as typically developing 
(TD) children and children with LD, suggesting that imagination may not be as impaired as 
Scott & Baron-Cohen (1996) claimed and is instead related to planning.  To tease between 
these hypotheses, it is necessary to compare these distinct methodologies in the same 
population of children, to account for the wide heterogeneity of ASD (Folstein & Rosen-
Sheidley, 2001).  
 Other evidence has shown impairment by children with ASD in imaginative drawing, 
but only when compared to TD children.  For instance, Low, Goddard, & Melser (2009) 
found that children with ASD produced fewer imaginative drawings relative to a TD control 
group.  Imaginative drawing was linked to generativity in ASD, as measured by how 
frequently children produced novel uses of objects and meanings of simple patterns.  The 
authors also performed a covariance relationship analysis (see Jose, 2003), which showed that 
planning mediated the relationship between imaginative drawing and generativity. Craig, 
Baron-Cohen, and Scott (2001) found deficits in children with ASD relative to TD children 
when asked to draw a ‘man with two heads’ and combine entities such as a car and train into 
one ‘unreal’ object.  A group of children with LD, however, also showed impairment, 
suggesting this may be an effect of cognitive delay.  Children with LD are thus a particularly 
interesting comparison group to include in the current study. 
The drawing differences of children with ASD in prior work can not be linked to 
ability per se, as drawing ability of individuals with ASD is equal to peers who are matched 
on mental age (Charman and Baron-Cohen, 1993; Eames and Cox, 1994; Allen & Chambers, 
2011).  However, differences have been detected in drawing style, in terms of a local rather 
than global approach consistent with weak central coherence (Mottron, Belleville, & Ménard, 
1999; Booth, Charlton, Hughes, & Happé, 2003), and overlap in pictures of humans but not 
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nonhumans (Fein, Lucci, & Waterhouse, 1990). Lee and Hobson (2006) also showed that 
children with ASD tended to draw similar pictures of humans, but were able to produce 
visually distinguishable drawings of houses, which may reflect specific difficulty depicting 
animate entities. 
Overall, the prior literature has identified several different processes involved in 
imaginative drawing tasks:  ‘pure’ imagination, generativity, and planning.  Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues view imagination in ASD as a pure deficit that stems from difficulty decoupling 
beliefs from reality.  This means that at a fundamental level, individuals with ASD are not 
able to mentally represent novel entities because they need to recruit theory of mind skills 
such as pretense.  Generativity is a related but separable component (Scott & Baron-Cohen, 
1996) that encompasses the ability to create novel ideas.  Its role in imaginative tasks has 
been debated. Low et al. found that the ability to derive novel uses for objects and determine 
multiple referents of abstract patterns related to imaginative drawing performance, but Scott 
& Baron-Cohen did not find any impairment by children with ASD in a ‘function of a brick’ 
or verbal fluency task when compared to clinical controls, even though the only the latter 
could create imaginative pictures.  It is difficult to assess the direct role of generativity as 
failure to produce creative pictures could reflect difficulties at the basic level of mental 
representation (‘pure’ deficit) or with producing multiple novel features (generativity); we 
thus do not directly test generativity here.  A third component in imaginative drawing tasks 
that can directly be assessed, and which we focus upon here, is planning.  Planning is 
necessary to translate a mental representation into graphical output, and requires successful 
construction and execution of a motor schema.  
To address the open questions in the literature and account for the disparate findings 
across different population samples, here we test the same children with ASD and children 
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with LD using several imaginative drawing conditions.  We vary the extent to which planning 
demands are required, to specifically test the pure imagination vs. planning hypotheses.   In 
two conditions, children are asked to draw figures from scratch, which requires a relatively 
high level of planning.  Children are asked to produce spontaneous pictures of ‘strange and 
funny looking’ creatures (to avoid any potential difficulty comprehending the term 
‘impossible’; see Low, Goddard, & Melser, 2009), and are also asked to combine, for 
instance, a car and train to produce a novel entity. Including both types of task can inform 
whether any potential imaginative deficits are specific to novel graphic schema, or extend to 
novel pictures that are derived from the modification of two familiar schemes (Craig, Baron-
Cohen & Scott, 2001).  A third condition requires a lower level of planning as children are 
given ‘headless’ templates to complete; in this way they do not have to construct and execute 
a full graphic plan and the task demands are minimized, but they still must produce 
imaginative elements (see Leevers & Harris, 1998). If children with ASD have difficulty with 
high and low planning tasks, this would support a pure imaginative deficit and failure at the 
level of representation.  If they are successful with the template task but show difficulty in the 
high planning conditions, however, this would support a planning hypothesis.  To examine 
whether an animate deficit is specific to humans, we also ask children to draw dogs.  These 
measures will allow us to test: 1) whether imagination deficits in ASD are pure, or instead 
relate to planning demands, and 2) if they are specific to ASD or stem from cognitive delay 
more broadly. 
Method 
Participants 
      Sixteen children with ASD (14 males, 2 females; M age:  13.6 years, range: 12.5–15.7 
years) and sixteen children with LD (10 males, 6 females; M age: 13.0 years, range: 11.6–
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15.7) were matched on chronological age (CA) and also receptive vocabulary as measured by 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997).  The 
mean mental age (MA) was 8.3 years (range: 5.4–11.1 years) for children with ASD and 8.3 
years (range 5.6-11.4 years) for children with LD.  One-way ANOVAs confirmed that neither 
CA nor MA differed between groups.  Participants were recruited from a Special Needs 
Secondary School in Merseyside, England. All children with ASD received a clinical 
diagnosis of ASD by a qualified educational or clinical psychologist, using standardized 
instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and Autism Diagnostic Interview - 
Revised; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 2002; Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994) and expert 
clinical judgment.  Autism diagnoses were confirmed in the ASD group and ruled out in the 
LD group using the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ, Rutter, Bailey & Lord, 
2003), which was completed by each participant’s class teacher (M score ASD = 26.7, range: 
22-31; M score MLD = 4.1, range 2-6). 
Materials 
      Children were provided with 6 blank sheets of paper, a pencil and eraser.  For the 
cued (template) condition, they were also given pre-drawn templates consisting of a man 
without a head and a dog without a head.   
Procedure 
    Participants were tested individually in schools and were situated in a quiet area to 
minimize distractions.  They were seated opposite the experimenter and materials were 
placed within their reach.  Every child received three conditions.  The Spontaneous condition 
was always administered first to minimize perseverative responding in the children with 
ASD; because the templates contained largely possible bodies of a human and a dog (missing 
only the head), children could potentially use these as a reference for subsequent drawings 
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(thereby underestimating their ability to draw imaginative features across the body).  The 
Cued condition, Unreal Category Mixing condition, and Real Picture drawings followed in a 
fixed order.  Two coders blind to group and hypotheses rated all the drawings.  All drawings 
were coded as ‘pass/fail’ and the proportion of impossible features was calculated.  Full 
coding criteria for all drawing types can be found in Appendix A. 
Spontaneous ‘Impossible’ Drawings.  Following Low, Goddard and Melser (2009), 
children were shown pictures of a number of people/dogs, walking towards a magic door. 
They were then read a passage of text designed to set the scene and increase the contextually 
available information: ‘The people (dogs) are walking towards a magic door, when they go 
through the magic door they will be changed into strange and funny looking people (dogs) 
that you won’t have seen before. Can you draw me a picture of a person (dog) that has gone 
through the magic door making them look strange and funny looking?’ 
  Order of dog/human drawings was counterbalanced, and the magic door backstory 
was re-introduced before the second drawing. Children were praised after completing each 
picture, regardless of content. 
Cued ‘Impossible’ Pictures.  Children were asked to complete templates of a human 
without a head and a dog without a head to make them look ‘impossible’. The experimenter 
said, ‘Here is a picture of a person (dog) without a head.  Can you complete it so that it is 
strange and funny looking?’ Order was counterbalanced.   
Unreal Category Mixing.  Children were also required to complete drawings that 
involved unreal category mixing (as per Craig, Baron-Cohen & Scott, 2001). The aim was to 
identify whether children with ASD were able to draw pictures that involved combining their 
representations of real entities to form a single unreal entity and required a high level of 
planning. Children were required to draw a creature that was half human, - half dog and a 
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vehicle that was half train - half car (counterbalanced for order). The experimenter said, 
‘Now I would like you to draw a creature (vehicle) that you might find through the magic 
door that is half human – half dog (half train - half car).’  
Real Pictures.  Children were also asked to draw pictures of a real human and a real 
dog (counterbalanced for order) as a gauge of the child’s normal drawing style and also to 
provide a comparison for cases where it was unclear whether the child had drawn an 
‘impossible’ picture.  These pictures were always drawn last to minimize any potential 
perseveration from executing a motor plan for a familiar entity to the impossible entities. The 
experimenter said, ‘Now I would like you to draw me a picture of a real person (dog).’  
Drawing Ability.  To provide a crude measure of drawing ability (accuracy), each real 
man and dog drawing was rank ordered against others of the same type to determine relative 
drawing ability of all participants.  Raters were asked to organize each of the drawing types from 
best (most realistic) to worst (least realistic), which provided rank orders (1–32) for both types of 
drawing).   
Results 
Reliability 
         Cohen’s Kappa was calculated to analyse the inter-rater reliability between the two 
coders for every picture. All values were greater than 0.85, showing excellent reliability, so 
the scoring of Rater 1 was used for the remainder of the analysis.1 
Spontaneous and Cued ‘Impossible’ Drawings 
                                                          
1 A number of the drawings produced by one child could not be interpreted as it was unclear 
what each feature included in the picture had intended to represent. Therefore, only the 
drawings for the spontaneous human, real human and human-dog were analyzed for this 
participant. In addition, one child with ASD was unwilling to complete any spontaneous 
drawing, but he was willing to complete the template drawings, which were included in the 
analysis. 
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 Separate chi-square analyses on the pass rate for spontaneous impossible drawings 
revealed significant group differences for both the spontaneous dog, χ²(1, N =31)=6.61, 
p=.01, Φ=.46, and spontaneous human figure, χ²(1, N =32)=3.87, p<.05, Φ=.35. In contrast, 
no group differences were obtained for the cued dog, χ²(1, N =31)=1.70, p=.19, Φ=.19, and 
cued human, χ²(1, N =31)=.86, p=.35, Φ=.17, drawings (see Figure 1).  McNemar tests were 
performed on trial type (e.g. human vs. dog) to probe for differences within each group; no 
significant differences were obtained for spontaneous or cued drawings.  Thus, children 
performed equally well in the human and dog trials.  Examples of drawings can be found in 
Appendix B.   
 Number of features.  The number of impossible features was expressed as a 
proportion of impossible features divided by the total number of features drawn for each 
figure. A mixed ANOVA was conducted for the spontaneous drawings with figure type 
(human, dog) as a within factor and group as a between factor. A significant main effect of 
group was obtained (F(1, 30) = 56.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .655), but there was no main effect of 
figure type or interaction. For the spontaneous human drawings, children with ASD produced 
21% impossible features and children with LD produced 41% impossible features.  For the 
spontaneous dog drawings, children with ASD produced 23% impossible features and 
children with LD produced 45% impossible features.   
A mixed ANOVA showed no significant group or figure type differences for the 
number of impossible features drawn for the cued human (ASD: 33%, LD: 47%) and cued 
dog drawings (ASD: 31%, LD: 39%). 
We also calculated the number of features produced overall (combined imaginative 
and non-imaginative) for each drawing.  No significant group differences were obtained for 
any of the drawing types (spontaneous human: ASD 5.7, LD 5.7; spontaneous dog: ASD 6.6, 
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LD 6.2;  train/car: ASD 4.1, LD 4.8;  human/dog:  ASD 5.9, LD 6.2; cued human: ASD 3.1, 
LD 3.1;  cued dog: ASD 2.9, LD 3.5; real human: ASD 5.3, LD 5.8; real dog:  ASD 6.3, LD 
6.3).   
Real human and dog drawings 
 Both groups correctly omitted impossible features in their real drawings (29/31 ASD, 
32/32 LD).  A significant group difference was observed for the number of features changed 
between the real human and spontaneous human drawings (F(1, 29) = 6.89, p = .014, ηp2 = 
.192), with children with ASD changing fewer features overall (1.3) than the LD group (2.6). 
Ability.  Mann-Whitney tests confirmed that the rank order was not statistically 
significant between groups for either the real dog or real human figures, thus the two groups 
were equated for drawing ability. 
Unreal category mixing 
 Chi-square analyses were performed to assess group differences in pass rates on the 
human-dog and train-car hybrid figures.  The success rates for the human-dog hybrid were 
56.2% for children with ASD and 93.8% for children with LD, a significant difference, χ²(1, 
N =32)=6.0, p=.014, Φ=.43.  For the train-car figure, the success rates were 31.2% for 
children with ASD compared to 68.8% for children with LD, also a significant group 
difference, χ²(1, N =32)=4.5, p=.034, Φ=.38.  A MacNemar test performed on trial type with 
both groups combined revealed a significant difference, χ²(1, N =32)=4.9, p=.027, indicating 
that the human-dog figures were easier for all participants to construct. A summary of 
performance across the different conditions can be found in Table 1.   
--- Insert Table 1 around here --- 
Relation between variables 
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 Correlation analyses were performed to detect relationships between MA, CA, 
performance on the SCQ and performance on the drawing tasks.  A Pearson’s correlation 
revealed a significant relationship between MA and pass rate for the spontaneous human 
(r=.796, p<.001), cued human (r=.768, p<.001), spontaneous dog (r=.564, p<.029), cued dog 
(r=.619, p=.0141) and human-dog (r=.533, p=.033) drawings for children with ASD only.  
The SCQ was negatively related to cued human drawing performance only (r=-.546, p=.035) 
for children with ASD (as a higher score on the SCQ indicates more autism characteristics), 
and CA was unrelated to all measures. Table 2 depicts all correlation values.  If the more 
stringent Bonferroni correction is applied to correct for multiple comparisons (alpha value of 
.003), only the correlations between MA and spontaneous human and cued human 
performance, respectively, remain significant. However, critics argue that this procedure 
inflates the risk of type II errors (e.g. Nakagawa, 2004; Rothman, 1990) or is unnecessary 
(Perneger, 1998). There was no relation between MA, CA, SCQ, and any of the drawing 
measures for the group with LD.   
Comparison across conditions  
 We also tested the differences between groups in the high (spontaneous and unreal 
category mixing) and low (cued) planning conditions.  Given the lack of significant 
differences between trial type (e.g. dog and human), data was collapsed and paired t-tests 
were conducted.  For the group with ASD, there was a significant difference between the 
unreal category mixing and cued conditions (t(15) = .034) and a trend towards significance 
between the spontaneous and cued conditions (t(15) = .082)   We found no significant 
differences across conditions in the LD group. 
Discussion 
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We investigated whether the failure of children with ASD to draw imaginative 
pictures stems from a fundamentally distinct neuro-cognitive system (as per Scott & Baron-
Cohen, 1996), or planning difficulty (as per Leevers & Harris, 1998).  We tested these 
hypotheses by comparing spontaneous and prompted drawing conditions requiring drawing 
of real and impossible stimuli in the same population of children.  Our results indicate that 
children with ASD are able to complete templates to make entities look ‘strange and funny’ 
just as successfully as children with LD, however they are unable to spontaneously do so.  
These results provide support for the planning hypothesis, rather than a pure deficit in 
imagination.  Our LD comparison group was able to depict impossible entities across all 
tasks, showing that the differences in the ASD group are not simply due to cognitive delay.   
Our results complement both Scott & Baron-Cohen (1996) and Leevers & Harris 
(1998) because we respectively confirmed their basic findings.  We also showed that 
imaginative deficits are not specific to constructing completely novel entities, but occur when 
individuals with ASD are also asked to combine familiar entities into something new.  It is 
likely that difficulty with planning underscores poor performance in the spontaneous and 
unreal category mixing conditions because they require that children continually monitor and 
update a sequence of planned actions, a process known to be impaired in ASD (Hill, 2004; 
Hughes, 1996). Poor planning has been observed in drawing production (Booth, Charlton, 
Hughes, & Happé, 2003), during tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi (Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1991), and at the neural level during motor actions (Fabbri-Destro, Cattaneo, Boria, 
& Rizzolatti, 2009). Although it is possible that differences in generativity might contribute 
to the pattern of performance we obtained (see Boucher, 2007), it cannot account for the 
success in the template condition, where both groups were able to generate imaginative 
entities.  Our data do not speak to the relative influence of generativity, thus it will be 
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important for future research to include measures of generativity in addition to planning 
manipulations in order to ascertain the specific contribution of each.  One possibility is to 
combine these aspects within a single paradigm (rather than using a separate generativity 
measure such as the novel uses task in Low et al.).  Children could be provided with a 
drawing of a circle vs. a more detailed template to manipulate planning and the instructions 
could vary to probe for renderings of real and ‘unreal’ stimuli.  In this way, one could tease 
apart the effects of planning from generation of novel real vs. novel imaginative entities. 
We did not find any differences between drawing type (people vs. dogs), suggesting 
any divergence in drawing content is not specific to humans, but instead reflects the 
underlying processes specific to novel, imaginative, depictions.  It will be interesting for 
future work to assess a wide variety of animate and inanimate stimuli to probe for further 
potential differences.  Both groups found it more difficult to create a train-car rather than 
human-dog figure, which we attribute to the fact that they were asked to draw both dogs and 
people before the category mixing condition, whereas any schema for the train-car was not 
previously primed and therefore had to be initiated from scratch.  It is also possible that the 
train-car was more difficult to depict because the two components were more perceptually 
similar to each other. 
 Links to mental age only for the ASD group suggest that receptive language ability 
mediates success on the impossible drawings, and that these children may be recruiting 
language to help guide them through the execution of a novel graphic schema.  Thus, the 
underlying skills supporting imaginative drawing appear to differ between our clinical 
groups.  Future work should assess the extent to which broader cognitive and language skills 
support imaginative drawing processes in ASD. More specifically, children could be 
measured longitudinally to determine whether language abilities predict subsequent 
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performance in imaginative tasks across development.  It would also be useful to compare 
performance across conditions that recruit language comprehension and ask children to draw 
nameable figures to performance in tasks where the items to be constructed are not nameable 
and thus do not rely upon prior linguistic knowledge (see Callaghan, 2000). 
 Of course, there are limitations to the present study.  We matched our ASD group to 
children with LD, but did not include a typically developing comparison sample.  Although 
we intentionally tried to avoid a CA-MA disparity and use an inclusive strategy (see Burack, 
Iarocci, Flanagan, & Bowler, 2004), it is possible that the pattern of data we obtained would 
not hold if compared to a TD group.  We found a correlation between performance on 
imaginative drawing tasks and MA in the ASD group, thus future work could test the 
planning hypothesis using a TD sample matched to the MA of the ASD participants (e.g. 8 
year-olds). A further limitation is that we only used a single cognitive measure (receptive 
vocabulary) as a matching variable.  Although prior studies of this nature also used receptive 
language to equate their groups (Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; Leevers & Harris, 1998; Low, 
Goddard, & Melser, 2009), measures of non-verbal IQ could be obtained in subsequent 
studies to provide a fuller picture of cognitive functioning.  We also caution that even though 
we did not find a significant group difference in the cued condition, we obtained small (but 
not negligible) effect sizes and the results are trending in the same direction as the 
spontaneous conditions. We also only detected a significant difference between the unreal 
category mixing conditions, but not the spontaneous and cued conditions. Thus a larger 
sample is required in future work to provide more robust power to discern whether such 
differences remain.  Finally, it would be prudent to include multiple measures of low-
planning tasks, rather than a single condition.  Despite these limitations, our study provides 
evidence for the role of planning in imaginative drawing in ASD, and confirms that 
IMAGINATIVE DRAWING IN AUTISM  16 
 
imaginative difficulty does not occur at the level of representation, nor is it an effect of 
cognitive delay. 
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Table 1 
 
Summary of results for group differences in pass rates 
 
Condition Group Difference 
  
Spontaneous  
          Human ✓ 
          Dog ✓ 
 
Cued (Template) 
 
          Human X 
          Dog X 
 
Hybrid 
 
          Human-Dog ✓ 
          Train-Car ✓ 
 
Real (Control) 
 
          Human X 
          Dog X 
  
✓ = yes; X = no 
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Table 2 
 
Correlations between mental age (MA), chronological age (CA), Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ) and pass rates for drawing types for the ASD group 
 
 
MA CA SCQ 
Spontaneous Human 
r =.796** 
p <.001 
r =.399 
p = .125 
r =-.384 
p = .142 
Spontaneous Dog 
r =.564* 
p =.029 
r =.154 
p = .584 
r =-.346 
p = .206 
 
Cued Human 
r =.768** 
p <.001 
r =.268 
p = .334 
r =-.546* 
p = .035 
 
Cued Dog 
r =.619* 
p = .014 
r =.081 
p = .775 
r =-.383 
p = .159 
 
Human/Dog Hybrid 
r =.533* 
p = .033 
r =.063 
p = .817 
r =-.384 
p = .142 
 
Train/Car Hybrid 
r =.278 
p = .298 
r =.058 
p = .832 
r =-.272 
p = .309 
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Appendix A 
Coding Schemes  
Spontaneous ‘Impossible’ Drawings.  Based upon Scott and Baron-Cohen (1996), a 
child’s picture was scored as ‘impossible’ if body parts of the human or dog were misshapen, 
positioned in an incorrect place, incorrectly orientated, alien features were added or features 
usually present were omitted. A picture was defined as unsuccessful if none of the above 
‘impossible’ features were detected and all features were correctly shaped, correctly 
positioned, correctly orientated, no alien features or elements were added, and if no elements 
that appeared on the ‘real’ drawing of the same creature were omitted.  
         The proportion of ‘impossible’ features drawn for each picture was also calculated 
following Low, Goddard and Melser (2009).  The number of ‘impossible’ features for a 
picture was calculated and then divided by the number of overall features. An overall feature 
for the human was counted if it represented either of the following: head, face, body, arms 
and hands, legs and feet, hair or ears.  A pair of legs or arms counted as a single feature and 
any additional features that were added, such as a tail on a human, were included as an 
overall feature. A feature was included as an overall feature for the dog if it represented the 
head, ears, face, body, front legs, back legs or tail. A feature was deemed as ‘impossible’ if it 
met the criteria of Scott et al. (1996) described above.  
Cued ‘Impossible’ Pictures.  The modified scoring system of Leevers and Harris 
(1998) was used for consistency with the spontaneous condition. In order for a child’s picture 
to be scored as ‘impossible’, the head of both the human or dog were misshapen, incorrectly 
orientated or positioned, alien features/elements were added to either the head or face or to 
other body parts on the template, or elements usually present were omitted. Elements usually 
present in a given entity that were omitted from the ‘impossible’ version, only allowed a 
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definition of ‘impossible’ if these features were present on the head/face in the ‘non-
impossible’ picture of the same creature. A picture was defined as unsuccessful if no 
‘impossible’ features were detected.  
  The proportion of ‘impossible’ features drawn was also calculated as per the 
spontaneous condition.  
Unreal Category Mixing.  Children’s drawings were scored as per Craig, Baron-
Cohen and Scott (2001). A score of ‘pass’ was recorded if children met the criteria of 
indicating a single entity that fused together elements of the two primary representations (e.g. 
the train-car condition had to be drawn as one ‘vehicle’ including features of both a train and 
a car). Children failed the task if two separate real entities were drawn or the drawing 
depicted only one of the two real entities for example only representing the dog and 
consisting of no human features. The number of features drawn in each picture was also 
counted.  
Real Pictures.  Real pictures were scored for number of imaginative features as per 
the criteria used in the spontaneous condition in order to provide a baseline measure of 
whether children included impossible features in their real drawings. We also coded the 
number of features that changed between each child’s real picture of a human or dog and 
their spontaneous ‘impossible’ human or ‘impossible’ dog. The overall number of features 
drawn for each picture was also calculated to investigate whether children included a 
different number of features in their drawings dependent upon whether they were of real or 
‘impossible’ entities. 
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Appendix B 
Examples of drawings from mental age matched participants with ASD and LD 
 ASD LD 
Real Human 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Spontaneous 
Impossible 
Human 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cued 
Impossible 
Human 
 
 
 
 
  
Unreal Category 
Mixing 
 
Human/Dog 
 
 
 
 
Train/Car 
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Figure 1. Percentage of children of each group (ASD and LD) able to create imaginative 
drawings across three conditions:  low planning (cued) and high planning (spontaneous and 
hybrid) 
 
 
